An Examination of Altruism and Religion

This paper: Ann Rand once wrote that altruism is incompatible with capitalism and if "civilization is to survive" (Rand, 1967) the morality of altruism should be rejected, reinforcing Nietzsche's notion that genuine morality is really self-assertion and strength.  This paper asserts that findings in sociobiology and related fields show that in fact, society, and by extension, capitalism, depends on altruism for cohesion, cooperation, and social capital.  Religion, specifically the Judeo/Christian/Islamic tradition, provides a normative functional structure that promotes various form of altruism.  However, this altruism is often reserved for ingroup members and sometimes religious motivation justifies altruistic acts against outgroups, both expressions of altruism were demonstrated in the terrorist attack on the World Trade Towers.  Understanding how altruism can manifest itself can help us understand why individuals sometimes behave the way they do and understanding the function altruism provides society and the benefits it provides can help promote beneficial altruism.

In a lecture at Yale University, Ayn Rand said "capitalism and altruism cannot coexist in the same man or in the same society" (Rand, 1967) and she rejected selfless service and sacrifice.  Her novel, Atlas Shrugged, Rand fleshes out her views by making her hero, John Galt, a man who feels no obligation to help others, only acting in self-interest.  Rand defined altruism as "man has no right to live for his own sake, that service to others is the only justification of his existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest moral duty, virtue, and value (Rand, 1967)." While her understanding of altruism (as a strong normative construct) is simple and narrow, it could also be argued that civilization and especially capitalism actually requires some forms of altruism to survive, especially reciprocal altruism.

August Comte was the first to use and define the term altruism (French, altruisme, derived from Latin alter: "other"). Comte (1851/ 1875) understood altruism as the unselfish desire to "live for others" (Batson and Shaw, 1991, p. 108) as opposed to egoism.    Rand promotes ethical egoism, that we should act to promote out own interests. Universal egoism claims that all actions ultimately promote self interest.  Advocates of altruism do not deny that much of what individuals do is egoistic, but they also claim that some individuals, at some times, are capable of acts that benefit others (Batson and Shaw, 1991, p. 107).  This position is also known as predominant egoism, again, the notion that individuals are essentially self interested, but capable of altruism.  One of the difficulties in defining altruism is that it is a subject that draws the attention of various disciplines - biology, sociology, anthropology, economics, psychology, sociology, philosophy, and theology, have all developed theories and concepts.  Accordingly, there are various defined forms of altruism, to include legal, religious, contract, obligatory, strong, weak, heroic, constructed, kin, reciprocal, normative, conventional, indiscriminate, universal, collegial, acute, absolute, actual, biological, suicidal, group selection, group identity, and perhaps even more.

Plato taught that before we can ascertain the nature of the good society, we need to determine the nature of individuals first (Sahakian, 1966, p. 59). Floyd Allport (1924) wrote: There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals (p. 4). At the heart of the issue is what is the nature of individuals?  Are people essentially self-interested or are they capable of genuine altruism? Thomas Hobbs, whose political philosophy helped contribute to the formation of modern democracies, formulated the social contract theory based on the Golden Rule.  Hobbs believed that people were basically untrustworthy and corrupt and needed to bind together into a social contract with each other for self-preservation, (Sakakian, 1966, pp. 69-71).  Additionally, it is claimed that James Madison, considered the father of the Constitution, agreed with Hobbs assuming that "the primary political motive of man was self-interest, and that men, whether acting individually or collectively, were selfish and only imperfectly rational (Marshall, 1977, p. 344).

Rand's philosophy seems to agree with the political philosophy of Hobbs and Madison.  Even Christian theology postulates that humans are essentially selfish and Rienhold Niebhur in his classic work Moral Man and Immoral Society, went even further and taught that collectives fall prey to egoism and self-interest (Niebhur, p. xviii). Although it can be claimed that descriptive egoism is not the same as proscriptive or ethical egoism, (as defined earlier). To describe how a thing is, does not imply an ought. The Scottish philosopher David Hume warned about the danger of using descriptive premises to support normative conclusions. The philosophy of Hobbs and Madison could be seen as descriptive only while Christian theology would be descriptive in regard to human nature and proscriptive in promoting altruism. In this line, Rand takes special offense against Kant's constructed altruism stemming from his deontological ethical system, as Kant meant to proscribe a formula for behavior.

Is Kant's promotion of altruism reasonable? Are people capable of really selfless acts?  The classic problem in altruism came initially from a Darwinian view of human nature that could not understand how sacrificial behavior could reproduce itself.  Sacrificial behavior should weed itself out over time.  If altruism is understood as Rand describes it, as self-sacrifice, then any action that produces a reduction in the reproductive viability of the actor for the benefit of the other, resulting their increased reproductive opportunities, should, over time, decrease in the gene pool by natural selection, leading to the question, how come "altruism has not been eliminated entirely?" (Grant, 2000, p. 6). Research has shown that apparent altruism is evident in a number of species, from viruses to humans (Bradley, 1999).  Etzioni, (2001) notes that there is ample evidence that people often sacrifice their interests for the benefit of others. To solve this apparent difficulty, various theories have been produced and tested that individuals act for the selection of the group, either kin or larger groups. 

The concept of natural selection, introduced by Darwin (1859/1872) emphasized individual selection, referring to the selection of traits that contribute to the survival and reproductive success of the individual. While Darwin focused on the individual level of selection (Ruse, 1980), he also suggested that selection could be for the group noting "selection may be applied to the family, as well as to the individual" (Darwin, 1859/1872, p. 204) and suggested that group selection could explain the development of moral codes (Bradley, 1999).

As Darwin noted, selection can work on the family.  Kin altruism also known as inclusive fitness is seen by some researchers as an extension of individual selection (Williams, 1997).  First proposed by Hamilton (1964), kin altruism is when an individual sacrifices for the benefit of relatives, increasing the fitness of the group at a cost to the individual. However, it could still be claimed that kin selection is still selfish as the individual sacrifice serves to promote the fitness and viability of the shared genes. Hamilton's inclusive fitness theory postulates that "an organism behaves over a lifetime in such a way as to maximize the copies of its genes, or alleles, which by one route or another it projects into the gene pools of future generations" (Heilmann, online). Altruism may also stem from trait group selection when cooperation provides benefits to the group that allows the group to be more productive than selfish groups (Wilson 1980, Wilson and Sober 1994).  "Selection may act to create physiological or psychological mechanisms designed to deliver benefits even to nonrelatives, provided that the delivery of such benefits acts, with sufficient probability, to cause reciprocal benefits to be delivered in return" (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992, p. 169). In addition, social psychological research has shown that high levels of group solidarity or cohesion facilitate cooperative behavior among group members and that individuals benefiting from an altruistic or prosocial act are more likely to engage in similar behavior toward others, so that helping behavior spreads through a social structure (Westphal, 1997). As Ridley writes that "Human existence requires cooperation; cooperation requires reciprocity" (1993, p. 55). Group living represents the survival strategy of cooperation (Brewer, 1999).

Another theory to account for altruism is reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984; Nowak and Sigmund 1998). Reciprocal altruism as a biological theory is complementary to the sociological concept of "The Norm of Reciprocity" and can be seen as a form of instrumental exchange to benefit from the actions of others which promote the self-interest of the actor.  
Reciprocity, while seemingly easily understood, is a term in flux without a clear definition. Gouldner believes the term is obscure and ambiguous and cites Howard Becker, who wrote a book on the subject, stated "I don't propose to furnish any definition of reciprocity; if you produce some, they will be your own achievements" (Gouldner, 1960, p. 161) Aside from sociologists, reciprocity is a concept that has drawn attention from anthropologists, biologists, economists, psychologists, philosophers, moral theorists, and even game theorists. This multifaceted research of reciprocity lends itself to contradictory and opposed viewpoints.  On the other hand, researchers have agreed that reciprocity is a concept of prime importance.  Rieck (1998) references Gouldner as saying that "there is no human society on earth that does not follow the Rule of Reciprocity" (p. 42).  Hobhouse noted that reciprocity is the vital principle of society and contributes to social stability (Gouldner, 1960, p.161).  Thurnwald writes that reciprocity is a principle that "pervades every relation of primitive life" (Gouldner, 1960, p.161).  Simmel believe that reciprocity is an important principle for all societies and contributes to social equilibrium and cohesion (Gouldner, 1960, p. 161). Some of the first studies of reciprocity come from gift giving in primitive cultures. Marcel Mauss noted the "significance and prevalence of the exchange of gifts and services in simpler societies" (Blau, 1998, p. 89). Bronislaw Malinowski understands reciprocity as the mutual obligations people owe each other within a context of social ties (Gouldner, 1960). The principle of reciprocity simply as a transactional obligation has been acknowledged and recognized since the time of Aristotle.  Aristotle in his Nichomanchean Ethics writes (Blau, 1964, p. 88):
 
"The moral type on the other hand is not based on stated terms, but the gift or other service is given as to a friend, although the giver expects to receive an equivalent or greater return, as though it had not been a free gift but a loan; and as he ends the relationship in a different spirit from that in which he began it, he will complain.  The reason of this is that all men, or most men, wish what is noble but choose what is profitable; and while it is noble to render a service not with an eye to receiving one in return, it is profitable to receive one.  One ought, therefore, if one can, to return the equivalent of services received, and to do so willingly. . .."

Cicero also acknowledges this simple obligation to reciprocate, he writes, "There is no duty more indispensable than that of returning a kindness … all men distrust one forgetful of a benefit"  (Gouldner, 1960, p. 161).

For the purposes of this paper, reciprocity is understood as the transactional sense of obligation between connected social actors embedded in social exchange. According to Blau (1964), social exchange relationships are based on trust. That is, when an individual gives to another, they do so trusting that the other party will reciprocate. Therefore, unlike economic exchange, social exchange is not an explicit, contractually based arrangement. It is the contention of this paper that reciprocity is an innate psychological construct adhering in social creatures, subject to cultural defining and reinforcement. According to Widegren (1983, p. 319)  social exchange is when the behavior of each party is oriented towards meeting the needs of the other person and not for some future reciprocation, although expectation may be present, but not as a primary motive - otherwise it would be instrumental exchange.

As part of a social exchange, reciprocity is transcultural norm.  Accordingly Gouldner's (1960) definition of reciprocity as: (1) people should help those who have helped them, and (2) people should not injure those who have helped them, will serve as the core understanding of reciprocity. As Gouldner notes (1960, p. 171), "We owe others certain things because of what they have previously done for us, because of the history of previous interaction we have had with them." This obligation is what undergirds the norm of reciprocity.  Gouldner writes that reciprocity is a universal norm (whose concrete formulations may vary) and suggest it may even serve as a duty that provides stability in social systems (Gouldner, 1960). 

As a social norm, reciprocity may have developed out of cooperative behavior within groups.  More specifically, the norm of reciprocity may be the product of "culture interacting with mental modules in order to solve specific problems of social exchange" (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1998, p. 380).  "It is claimed that people have always lived in groups and that cooperative behavior provides many benefits to the group. Kin groups may have fused into larger social groups for hunting or defense (Shaw and Wong, 1987, p. 54). This required the social and cultural organization necessary to hold larger groups together. It is possible that reciprocity developed from hunting (as noted earlier), food sharing, and coalition forming. Bernd and Marzluff, examine why Ravens, when locating food in the form of a carcass, will fly off and return with a flock of other Ravens to share the food.  Their research supports the notion that food sharing is a successful strategy for maximing survival. Verkamp (1995, p. 184) writes how the foraging Ache of eastern Paraguay and Netsilik Eskimo's will share food with unrelated families. Both groups seem to be using food redistribution as a form of banked obligation or reciprocal altruism. For Humans and Ravens, cooperation serves the common good by harnessing self interest. Food sharing is a form of banked reciprocity.  Axelrod and Hamilton, (1981, Bradley, 1999) note that apes and monkeys frequently form coalitions.  Coalitions often involve actions that are expected to be reciprocated.  Reciprocal altruism can also be seen as a form of banked reciprocity in which weak altruistic behavior is expected to be repaid in the future (Heylighen, 1993).

Pierce (1999) writes that "Psychological mechanisms have their origins deep in the shadows of our ancestral past (p. 843)"  The ancestral past for the most part was "the highly social clan life of mobile hunter-gatherer existence" (Nicholson, 1997, p. 1055).  Because of this past, we are said to "inherit a circuitry which is modularized for solving social exchange problems" (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith, 1998, p. 380). One of these social exchange problems would be cooperation and reciprocity. The norm of reciprocity is therefore understood as "the product of culture interacting with mental modules in order to solve specific problems of social exchange" (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1998, p. 380). Reciprocity for human hunters may have taken the form of "I share my meat with you when I am lucky at the hunt, and you share yours with me when you are lucky" (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1998, p. 338). It is important to note that, while build upon the foundation of inheritable psychological mechanisms, and innate, norms, like reciprocity, do not determine specific behaviors, and human behavioral flexibility allows us to "retain our ancient psychology but use it in new ways for our current circumstances" (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1998).   Part of this shaping is evolution molding emotional capacities and predispositions (Pope, 1998, p. 545).

This flexibility would explain the variety of rules and behavioral specifics throughout history and between cultures regarding reciprocity. Darwin noted that "any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts ... would inevitably acquire a moral sense." (Darwin, p.  374). Reciprocity seems to be an innate social instinct.. It has been noted that children, even if they are secretly observed, generally discuss matters of justice and fairness without reference to adult authority or rules (Wilson, 1993, p. 60).  Gouldner (1960, p. 177) references Piaget who noted that "reciprocity stands so high in the eyes of the child that he will apply it even where to us it seems to border on crude vengeance."

Surprisingly, not only do humans and human children reciprocate, but so do chimpanzees, impalas, even vampire bats! Chimpanzee researchers have noted that chimps possess a "set of rules for reciprocity" (Powledge, 1996, p. 396).  As a social norm, reciprocity functions to provide rules of conduct of how an individual should behave in a social pack. Surprisingly, reciprocity functions in chimpanzee troops very similar to human groups; chimpanzees also feel a sense of obligation to return favors and do not seem to like the "a one-sided accumulation of benefits" (de Waal 1991, p. 343).  Chimpanzees also remember who reciprocates and who does not in the pack, and will exercise negative reciprocity with those who do not reciprocate (Harnden and Warwick, 1997; Powledge, 1996) and will engage in calculated reciprocity (Harden-Warwick, 1997). For impala, reciprocity takes the form of grooming behavior, in which ticks are picked off another impala.  This grooming is typically followed by a responding in kind (Dugatkin, 1997). Even neonatal fawns three days old display this behavior (Dugatkin, 1997). Ridler address the cooperative nature of vampire bats who "donate" surplus blood (it seems that bats can hold more than they currently need).  Apparently, vampire bats, which live up to 18 years, are good at sharing with other bats who share and not sharing with those who don't (Ridley, 1996, p. 62-63).  It seems that many animals will cooperate and share resources with nonrelatives, although according to the norm of reciprocity. Cooperation is increasingly being seen as being adaptive behavior as the individuals that reciprocate are more successful.  In this sense, altruistic behavior would pay off as  "the minor cost that one individual might pay to help another could be more than made up for if, sometime in the future, the second individual helps the first" (Dugatkin, 1997, p. 356). 

This sort of "banking" of obligations is reminiscent of the Ik of Uganda or in Coleman's understanding of social capital as an asset to be withdrawn in time of need. Perhaps due to the innate nature of reciprocity, some have capitalized on this sense of obligation to use reciprocity instrumentally as a tool of power and status (Blau, 1964, p. 108). In this sense, the norm of reciprocity may be capitalized on instrumentally.  Elster (1989a, p. 111) references from Colin Turnbull's work on gift giving, titled, The Mountain People,  where the norm of reciprocation seems to have instrumentally gotten completely out of hand to the point of no longer serving as a functional mechanism but instead becoming dysfunctional.  He cites the Ik of Uganda where gift giving and helping behaviors have become a tool to build up a collection of obligations to draw upon in times of crisis.  Elster cites examples where a group of men, so large it was almost causing the house to collapse, were helping to thatch a house over the protest of the owner (who assumedly, did not want to be obligated to such a large group).  Apparently, the Ik spend a great deal of time attempting to incur, repay, and avoid obligations. This example of banked obligations is very similar if not the same as the Sociologist's James Coleman's explanation that the strength of individual social capital is found in the obligations "owed" stemming from social capital "credit slips" (Coleman, 1990).  Coleman (1990, p. 309) questions why rational actors create obligations.  Coleman provides one possible answer that a favor ordinarily occurs when there is a great need from one party and the favor provided involves no great cost.  In this sense, a favor provided could be seen as a deposit that can be withdrawn when there is great need. Essentially, creating an obligation can be seen as a transaction based on the natural sense of reciprocity that makes an investment at little cost but may be returned at a time of great need.  The Ik of Uganda seem to be collecting social capital credits to redeem in time of need. Widegren (1997) notes that instrumental exchange is a means of obtaining behavior from others which promotes the self-interest of the actor." In this sense, altruism as a social norm can be misused or used instrumentally as utilitarian device, (as the Ik of Uganda seem to have done) and hence mask self-interested behavior. Reciprocal altruism then can be manipulated to establish superordination over others (Blau, 1964) and as an instrumental tool (Elster, 1989a). 

Additionally, Portes (1998) also notes that Durkheim's theory of social integration provides additional information regarding the nature of reciprocity in social exchange theory.  With both actors embedded into a social structure, the creation of an obligation may not be repaid from the recipient but from the "collective as a whole in the form of status, honor or approval" (p. 9).  This complicates discerning altruistic behavior as the question of motive cannot be easily, if at all, determined. Altruistic acts could be capitalized on instrumentally as a tool of power and status (Blau, 1964).  Instrumental reciprocal altruism then could be form of social capital. Coleman notes that creating obligations can serve as a insurance policy of sorts in which inexpensive currency arrives later in the form of valuable "currency" (1990, p. 310).  Portes (1998, p. 7) confirms this view of social capital as the "accumulation of obligations from others according to the norm of reciprocity." Leana and Van Buren (1999) note that some researchers have formulated social capital as an asset that individuals can "spend" to better their situations (p. 540).  Naturally, to obtain these benefits a person must be related to others who are the potential source of advantage (Portes, 1998, p. 7).  Social capital in this sense supports Coleman's (1990), Loury's (1977, 1987), and Bourdieu's (1986) conceptualization of social capital as a set of resources that adhere in relations.  Hawkes (1992, p. 275) calls this sort of creation of obligations as "delayed reciprocity" where a "short term cost to the "altruist" is exceeded by benefits returned to him later (Trivers, 1971).

On the other hand, reciprocity as a process of social exchange, which may originate in pure self interest, may also serve to generate trust in social relations through recurrence (Blau, 1964). As reciprocity becomes reinforced by the community and internalized individually, failure to discharge obligations would result in guilt (Blau, 1964, p. 97). Elster, (1989b, p.119) argues that norms operate through shame and guilt (rather than rewards and punishments). In this sense, reciprocity serves not only as a starting mechanism, but functionally to social stability.

One critical distinction can be made between what could be called biological altruism and social altruism, and that is intentionality and motive.  While we inherit genetic predispositions, we are also formed and completed by culture. Humans are born with a large repertoire of "genetically encoded mechanisms" that are the foundation of behavior (Pierce, Decker and White, 1999, p. 843). Humans construct cultures to make sense of the world around them.  This is necessary because, unlike other animals, humans are unfinished animals who complete themselves through culture (Trice, 1993, p. 20).  Altruism, then is not only an innate psychological mechanism, but is also a social norm reinforced by learning and capable of being redirected. Additionally, altruism may be reinforced in the ability for perspective taking and the development of moral principles (Wagner and Rush, 2000).

In examining reciprocity as a social norm within social exchange, there is a difference between Gouldner who understands reciprocity as a starting mechanism (1960) and Blau (1964) who understands reciprocity as stemming from existential conditions of exchange that are the starting mechanism of social interaction. According to Gouldner (1960), reciprocity serves both as a stabilizing function in social groups as well as a starting mechanism that helps initiate social interaction.  As a stabilizing function, the obligations of reciprocity contribute to the stability of social systems.

It has been noted that "our social instincts continue to try to shape and create social relations and systems in ways that are consistent with our nature. Under the driving force of our ancestral psychology, we create institutional structures, social relations, and patterns of socialization which have forms and functions designed to serve our needs" (Nicholson, 1997). Religious structures, in a functional sense, promote altruism to serve the needs of social living and facilitate cohesive social interaction.

Additionally, "as ingroups become larger and more depersonalized, the institutions, rules, and customs that maintain ingroup loyalty and cooperation take on the character of moral authority" (Brewer, 1999).  This authority can manifest itself as normative influence (Turner, 1991, p. 35) resulting in social pressure (Turner, 1991, p. 37) to conform to group norms.  Additionally, as Wilson notes, "There is a hereditary selective advantage to membership in a powerful group united by devout belief and purpose (Wilson).  This membership provides social identity, (Tajfel, 1972)  "the individual's knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership" (1972, p. 292) "creates and defines an individual's own place in society" (Tajfel, 1972, p. 293).